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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This is an appeal from a decision of the trial court dated 
April 6, 1990, Notice of Appeal filed on April 11, 1990 by 
Intervenor and May 2, 1990 by Plaintiff-Appellant. It is from a 
final judgment under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
There are two separate appellants, Plaintiff personally and 
as administratrix of the M.J. Hiltsley estate, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, and the estate of Etta Wood, Intervenor and 
Appellant. 
RUTH HILTSLEYfS CLAIM 
Plaintiff and Appellant Hiltsley claims that the judgment of 
the trial court is contrary to the undisputed evidence before the 
trial court, is contrary to the statutes of the State of Utah, 
Utah Code Annotated, § 57-1-5, and decisions of this court 
relating to the rights of tenants in common, namely Matter of 
Estate of Gorrell. 765 P.2d 878 (Utah 1988), and Jollev v. Corrv, 
671 P.2d 139 (Utah 1983). Trial court refused to recognize the 
decision of Judge Croft awarding plaintiff Ruth Hiltsley judgment 
in the amount of $4,924.66, which judgment has never been 
overturned or on which there has been no contrary evidence 
submitted since the trial before Judge Croft. The court ignores 
the law of res judicata and collateral estoppel as established by 
the following cases: Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 
(1978); WiLde v. Mid-Century Insurance Company, 635 P.2d 417 
(1981); Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 
1983); and Baxter v. Department of Transportation, 705 P.2d 1167 
(Utah 1985) ; Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 
P.2d 451 (1988); Noble v. Noble, 461 P.2d 1369 (1988). 
ISSUE RELATING TO INTERVENOR ETTA WOOD'S ESTATE 
Judgment of the trial court is contrary to the 
uncontroverted evidence. Evidence establishes without 
controversy that Milton J. Hiltsley held assets of the estate of 
Etta Wood in trust for said estate, which assets are now in the 
possession of the defendant, Hallalene M. Ryder. Ryder gave no 
consideration for the Wood assets. The following authorities 
support the requirement that a resulting or constructive trust be 
recognized on the assets in the possession of Hiltsley. In the 
Matter of the Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982); Baker v. 
Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 
(Utah 1987) ; Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day-Saints v. 
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Watson, 25 Utah 45, 699 P.531 (1902); Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 
16, 253 P.2d 440 (1953), Restatement of Law of Trusts, § 44 0, 
Illustration (b) (2); Restatement of Restitution, Section 160; In 
re Park v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (1983); Haws 
v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 PI.2d 229 (1949); In re Swan's 
Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d 682 (1956). 
The decision of the trial court refuses to recognize the 
decision of Judge Croft in the same proceedings and failed to 
recognize or apply the doctrine of res judicata or- collateral 
estoppel contrary to the following decisions of this court: 
Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (1978); Wilde v. Mid-
Century Insurance Company, 635 P.2d 417 (1981); Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983); and Baxter v. 
Department of Transportation, 705 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1985); Mel 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451 (1988); 
Noble v. Noble, 461 P.2d 1369 (1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the third appeal of the above-entitled matter by 
parties. The first appeal was to this court by the defendant 
Hallalene M. Ryder. The decision of the court is reported in 
Hiltslev v. Ryder, 738 P.2d, pg 1024 (Utah 1984). Decision on 
the second appeal by the Court of Appeals is Case No. 890181-CA, 
dated September 27, 1989, unreported. 
The original decision in this case by Judge Bryant Croft 
ruled that the intervenor, Estate of Etta Wood, was entitled to 
have a constructive trust impressed on assets in the possession 
of M.J. Hiltsley, deceased, which were given by him during his 
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lifetime to defendant Hallalene M. Ryder. This court in its 
decision made the following order, 738 P.2d, pg 1026: 
Because the trial court should have required that Etta 
Wood!s estate be joined before deciding the case as it 
did, we reverse the case and remand for joinder of Etta 
Wood's estatec No costs awarded. 
Note 5 adds the following to the decision: 
In making this disposition, we in no way rule upon the 
merits of the constructive trust issue. To do so would 
be improper since the record was developed without 
representation by Etta Wood's estate. However, for the 
benefit of the trial court, we refer it to Ashton v. 
Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151-42 (Utah 1987), and Baker v. 
Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 636-37 (Utah 1984). 
The trial court, J. Dennis Frederick, on motion of counsel 
for defendant, dismissed the claim of intervenor and plaintiff 
on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired while 
the matter was on appeal to this court. This decision was 
reversed by the Court of Appeals in Case No. 890181-CA dated 
September 27, 1989. 
On the second trial, the matter was submitted to Judge 
Frederick based on the record in the first trial, with the only 
live witness who was a party being Hallalene Ryder whose 
testimony was not different from the original trial. At the 
close of the trial Judge Frederick granted judgment in favor of 
the defendant and against intervenor no cause of action. Court 
then granted judgment in favor of defendant and against the 
plaintiff no cause of action on plaintiff's claim for judgment in 
the sum of $4,924.66. 
The basis of this judgment was a determination by the court 
that there was no evidence presented that would enable the court 
to determine that deceased Milton J. Hiltsley in any fashion 
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exercised dominance, undue influence, or inappropriate influence 
over Etta Wood or her property and that there was no evidence to 
show in what capacity he received the money of Etta Wood and that 
there was not sufficient evidence to impose a constructive trust 
on the moneys in the various bank accounts. 
The court also determined that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the judgment granted by Judge Croft of 
$4,924.66 to plaintiff Ruth Hiltsley. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The only party who was a witness at the trial before Judge 
Frederick was defendant Hallalene Ryder. Plaintiff Ruth Hiltsley 
being too ill to come to court, the matter was submitted on the 
basis of the record made in the first trial, with certain pages 
referred to specifically relating to the interest of Ruth 
Hiltsley and Ryder in the bank accounts into which the Etta Wood 
money was indicated as having been deposited. A photostatic copy 
of the pages out of the diary of M.J. Hiltsley, deceased, is as 
follows: 
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Neither Ryder nor Ruth Hiltsley testified as to any 
discussion with deceased M.J. Hiltsley about the Etta Wood 
moneys. The diary pages are all the evidence concerning receipt 
by M.J. Hiltsley of the Etta Wood money. 
Corroborating the entries in the diary and demonstrating 
their accuracy are the records of the American Savings and Loan 
account, Exhibit 43-P and Exhibit 5-P, which shows a deposit of 
$10,000.00 on October 5, 1979, and the closing of the account on 
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October 29, 1979 with the withdrawal of two items, one for 
$1,489.21 and the other for $36,000.00. 
The withdrawal of $1,489.21 is explained by Exhibit 43-P 
showing a division of the amount between M.J. Hiltsley and Ryder 
with a balance for transfer fees of $141.78 and the notation that 
it was Melody's condo. 
Judge Croft, in his analysis of the $36,000.00 paid into the 
condo purchase price, analyzed the account as follows in his 
memorandum, page 53-54 of the record on appeal: 
As to the $3 6,000.00 paid on the purchase of 
defendant's condo on the "Red Letter Day" of 10/5/79, 
it is apparent, as set out supra, that $16,150.68 
thereof was traceable from defendant's other bank 
accounts. At trial it was stipulated by plaintiff's 
counsel that the $1,000.00 paid as earnest money on the 
purchase of the condo could be credited to defendant, 
although as also noted supra, that amount is set forth 
as an expenditure (on page 252 of Ex P-10) by Milton. 
Since $10,000.00 of the $36,000.00 came from Etta's 
money, $9,849.32 must be deemed to have come from 
Hiltsley funds. Plaintiff's name was placed on that 
account when opened on 10/1/79 under the names of "M.J. 
Hiltsley and Ruth Hiltsley and H. M. Ryder". This 
account was not set up as a joint tenancy account and 
must be construed as a tenancy in common. However, it 
does not seem just to say that plaintiff would thus own 
one-third of the funds defendant deposited into the 
account, nor would it be just to say that defendant 
was, nevertheless, entitled to a one-thirty tenancy 
interest in the $9,849.32 deposited therein by 
Hiltsley. Although plaintiff's name was put on the 
$3 6,000.00 check, she did not endorse it and knew 
nothing about it until after Milton's death. Based 
upon these facts I rule that plaintiff had an ownership 
interest in one-half of the $9,849.32 so deposited, or 
$4,924.66. 
The title to the condo was taken in the name of Hallalene 
Ryder and M.J. Hiltsley as joint tenants (see Exhibit 9-P). 
Judge Frederick ruled that there was no evidence to support 
a constructive trust. He made no effort to trace the proceeds 
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into the Ryder account as Judge Croft did. Judge Croft's 
decision concerning the tracing of funds has not been 
controverted or even disputed to this point. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
CLAIM OF ESTATE OF ETTA WOOD 
POINT I: TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CORRECTLY APPLY 
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO INTERVENOR'S CLAIM 
CLAIM OF RUTH S. HILTSLEY 
POINT I: TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO APPLY 
THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO 
HILTSLEY'S CLAIM 
LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO BOTH CLAIMS 
POINT I: TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE 
OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RECOGNIZE THE 
DECISION OF JUDGE CROFT AS BINDING ON 
THE COURT 
ARGUMENT 
CLAIM OF ESTATE OF ETTA WOOD 
POINT I: TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CORRECTLY APPLY 
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO INTERVENOR'S CLAIM 
The Utah Supreme Court over many years has applied the 
doctrine set forth in the Restatement of Law of Trusts, § 440, 
pg 393. The section clearly applies to the facts of the Etta 
Wood estate. It reads as follows: 
§ 440. General Rule 
Where a transfer of property is made to one person and 
the purchase price is paid by another, a resulting 
trust arises in favor of the person by whom the 
purchase price is paid, except as stated in §§ 441,442 
and 444. 
In subsection b., the Restatement states that the rule stated in 
the section is applicable to transfers of personal property as 
well as transfers of real property. As illustrations, it gives 
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the following as Illustration No. 2, pg 394: 
2. A deposits money in a bank in the name of B. In 
the absence of evidence of a different intention on the 
part of A, B holds his claim against the bank for the 
amount of the deposit upon a resulting trust for A. 
The case closest on the facts relating to this matter is 
Matter of Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982). This was a 
brother-sister relationship where the brother gave property to 
his sister. A purchase money trust was determined to exist. The 
court carefully considered the section of the Restatement of 
Trusts as quoted and reviewed the prior Utah cases which 
recognized the Restatement rule as applicable. The language of 
Matter of Estate of Hock, Id., pg 1115, reads as follows: 
The general rule for the creation of a purchase money 
resulting trust by operation of law has been set out in 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 440 (1959): 
Where a transfer of properties is made to one 
person and the purchase price is paid by another, 
a resulting trust arises in favor of the person 
by whom the purchase price is paid, except as 
stated in §§ 441,442 and 444. 
A similar formulation of this doctrine has been adopted 
in Utah, Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 
(1953), and we have previously cited with approval 
§ 440 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. Little v. 
Alder, 19 Utah 2d 163, 428 P.2d 156 (1967). The fact which 
must be proven in the case of a purchase money resulting 
trust is that one party paid the purchase price for property 
and another party was given legal title. The recitals in 
the deed do not preclude evidence of the actual transaction. 
Jackson v. Hernandez, Texas, 155 Tex. 249, 285 S.W.2d 184 
(1956). Professor Scott in his treatise on trusts explains 
the interworking of these factors: 
If there!s no evidence as to the intention of 
the parties, other than the fact that A paid 
the purchase price for conveyance to B, a 
resulting trust arises in favor of A. It is 
unnecessary for A to introduce further evidence 
that the trust was intended, since the character 
of the transaction itself raises the inference 
that B was not to take the property beneficially. 
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The court in Park v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590 
(Utah 1983), was confronted with the problem of interpreting a 
constructive trust claim and applied a section of the Law of! 
Restitution and imposed a constructive trust on the estate of a 
deceased wife in favor of her husband. The ruling was designed 
to present unjust enrichment. The law concerning the imposition 
of the constructive trust and applying § 160 of the Restatement 
of Restitution, pg 640, reads as follows: 
Section 160 presents the broadest possible application 
of a constructive trust. It provides that a 
constructive trust may arise "where a person holding 
title to property is subject to an equitable duty to 
convey it to another on the ground that he would be 
unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it . . 
. .
ff
 Such breadth has also been described as follows: 
Constructive trusts include all those instances 
in which a trust is raised by the doctrines of 
equity for the purpose of working out justice 
in the most efficient manner, where there is 
no intention of the parties to create such a 
relation, and in most cases contrary to the 
intention of the one holding the legal title, 
and where there is no express or implied, written 
or verbal, declaration of the trust. 
In 1987 the court had a brother-brother relationship as far 
as trustor and trustee is concerned in Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 
14 7 (Utah 1987). A brother deeded property, with an oral 
agreement on the part of the deceased brother to reconvey. 
Court there cited as support for the creation of a constructive 
trust Estate of Hock, Id., and Park v. Zions First National 
Bank, and reviewed the prior decisions of the court. It stated 
in the following language that a constructive trust is an 
equitable remedy which arises by operation of law to prevent 
unjust enrichment, pg 599: A constructive trust is an equitable 
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remedy which arises by operation of law to prevent unjust 
enrichment. Accordingly, parol evidence may be introduced to 
establish a constructive trust. 
One of the interesting holdings in Ashton v. Ashtonf Id., 
which is applicable to the present facts is that the person into 
whose hands the property on which a trust has been imposed was 
not a bona fide purchaser. Held transferee takes subject to the 
trust. The property was at the time of trial in the hands of the 
deceased brother's widow. 
In Ashton v. Ashton, Id., the court distinguishes the cases 
where clear and convincing evidence is required from the cases 
where parol evidence may be introduced to establish a 
constructive trust. It pointed out that where it is necessary to 
alter a deed which is regular in form and presumed to convey 
clear title, it is necessary to present clear and convincing 
evidence, 753 P.2d 151. 
Another case cited in the original decision in this case by 
the court is Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983). It is a 
case where deeds were executed which had been recorded and in 
place for many years. It was a situation where no confidential 
relationship existed between the parties nor were they related. 
The clear language of Restatement of Trust, § 440, Id., 
recognizes without stating the rule set down in Rule 160 of the 
Restatement of Restitution, Id., that to allow one party to keep 
property without consideration is unjust enrichment. A 
presumption of a trust relationship arises. The presumption is 
rebuttable, but the burden of proof shifts to the person seeking 
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to rebut the presumption. 
Trial court erroneously believed, apparently, that it 
required clear and convincing evidence to give rise to a trust. 
This is a clear mistake of law. Where there is no document that 
must be varied or no written instrument whose terms are clear on 
its face, clear and convincing evidence is not required. 
The evidence is clear that deceased M.J. Hlltsley came into 
possession of his sister's bank account and deposited it in his 
own accounts. There is no evidence that the sister intended to 
give title to the brother or that she intended to make a gift or 
otherwise transfer her interest. The presumption of resulting 
trust was not rebutted. 
Transfer of the Etta Wood money was made during Etta's 
lifetime on October 5, 1979 when the items were transferred into 
the accounts of deceased. The American Savings and Loan account 
was then further used on October 29, 1979 to pay on the Ryder 
condo, title to which was taken in the name of Ryder and deceased 
M.J. Hiltsley as joint tenants. 
It is the position of the intervenor that the evidence o|f 
the receipt by deceased of the Etta Wood moneys is clear. 
Deceased's own handwriting acknowledges this without dispute from 
any oral or other written evidence. His diary entries were 
corroborated by the various transfers and entries that have been 
demonstrated and on which Judge Croft relied in tracing the funds 
from Etta Wood into the accounts in the name of deceased at the 
time of his death and into the condo purchase price. 
It is respectfully submitted that Judge Frederick 
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erroneously interpreted the law. He failed to apply the laws of 
the State of Utah as set down in this court's decisions which 
govern resulting trusts. He refused to impose a resulting trust 
on the funds received from Wood without consideration. 
CLAIM OF RUTH S. HILTSLEY 
POINT I. TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO APPLY 
THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO 
HILTSLEY'S CLAIM 
Trial court failed to recognize the interest of Ruth 
Hiltsley in the joint account which was used for the purpose of 
purchasing the Ryder condo. No evidence has been produced which 
would in any way controvert Judge Croft's analysis of the moneys 
that were in the American Savings and Loan account. Defendant 
Ryder was given credit for all of the deposits shown to have been 
made by her into the account. The estate of Etta Wood was 
given credit for its funds deposited in the account. The 
balance was then determined to be the property of deceased and 
his wife, Ruth Hiltsley, as tenants in common. 
It is undisputed Ruth Hiltsley did not know that the funds 
in the joint account were being withdrawn to purchase an interest 
in the condo in which Ryder and deceased would be joint tenants, 
R.P. 214. 
The law is clear that a joint tenant who acts against the 
interests of the joint tenancy breaks the tenancy. In Tracy 
Collins v. Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 350, 301 P.2d 1086, the husband 
mortgaged joint property owned by himself and his wife. It was 
held that this severed the joint tenancy. Only his interest 
could be held for his debt. In Nelson v. Nelson, 592 P.2d 594, 
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the court held that a joint tenant could sever the tenancy and 
convert it into tenancy in common by giving a deed to his 
interest in the property. In First Security Bank v. Demiris, 10 
Utah 2d 405, 354 P.2d 97, the wife, joint tenant, drew out the 
full account in the joint account. Her husband, the other joint 
tenant, then died. His estate was able to establish an interest 
in the full account, since her withdrawal severed the joint 
tenancy and the husband could then show ownership of the whole 
account deposited from his independent funds. In Jolley v. 
Corey, 671 P.2d 139 (Utah 1983), the court held that a joint 
tenancy could be severed by voluntary conveyance to a third party 
and also could and would be severed by the involuntary 
conveyance by judicial sale on foreclosure. 
As Judge Croft ruled, the conduct of deceased severed the 
joint tenancy in the American Savings account. The parties were 
then, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, owners of ct 
one-half interest in said account by reason of the Utah statute 
relating to joint tenancy and the requirement of equal interest. 
See 57-1-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Judge Croft's analysis of the American Savings and Loan 
account used to purchase the condo has never been attacked. It 
is submitted said analysis is accurate. If anything, it is more 
generous toward defendant and the estate of M.J. Hiltsley thah 
would be required. 
It is respectfully submitted that Ruth Hiltsley is entitled 
to judgment for her share of the joint account which was used to 
purchase the Ryder condo. As demonstrated by Judge Croft, the 
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amount is $4,924.66. 
LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO BOTH CLAIMS 
POINT I: TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE 
OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RECOGNIZE THE 
DECISION OF JUDGE CROFT AS BINDING ON 
THE COURT 
Both appellants join in the proposition that the 
determination by Judge Croft of the rights of the parties to the 
funds that were in the hands of the deceased and disposed of by 
him during his lifetime became a final disposition of this matter 
when the Supreme Court did not reverse the decision of Croft and 
remitted the matter for the joinder of Etta Wood's estate. 
The doctrine of res judicata would probably apply in this 
matter had it not been for the fact that the estate of Etta Wood 
was not joined as a party in the action. Croft determined the 
rights of all parties in his decision. Since the estate was not 
a party, the doctrine applicable is that of collateral estoppel. 
In numerous cases since 1978 this court has applied the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel and distinguished it from the 
doctrine of res judicata. In 1978 the court decided Searle 
Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), and set down the 
difference between collateral estoppel and res judicata. Since 
that time there have been numerous cases that have applied the 
doctrine. Among them are Wilde v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 63 5 
P.2d 417 (Utah 1981), Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 
1982), Schaer v. State, By and Through the Department of 
Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), and Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). Cases by the 
Appeals Court have followed the court's rulings. See Copper 
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State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 (Utah 1987), Mel 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451 
(Utah 1988), and Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988). 
Since the earliest cases, the courts have repeatedly stated 
that the rule of collateral estoppel is to preclude relitigation 
of issues that were litigated and finally determined in prior 
actions. 
Judge Croft's decision, while returned to the trial court 
for the joinder of Etta Wood's estate as a party, has never been 
reversed or modified in its primary and fundamental holdings* 
There has never been a claim made that he erroneously interpreted 
the law or found facts which were not supported by evidence. 
In the retrial, only the evidence originally submitted to 
Judge Croft was reconsidered. The only witness that was sworn 
and testified who was a party was Melody Ryder. Her testimony 
did not differ from what it was in the Croft conducted trial. 
Appellants submit that it would be an unusual situation if 
one trial court was authorized to reverse a trial judge without 
the same having been determined to be an erroneous opinion, 
contrary to the evidence or law. 
Ryder should certainly not be able to complain of the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel being applied, since she was a 
party to all of the litigation before Croft and could have made 
any claim that she had to the assets that were being considered 
by the court. At no place in the testimony or evidence is there 
any claim by Ryder that she has some interest in the moneys that 
came from Etta Wood into the hands of deceased M.J. Hiltsley. 
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She received in Croft!s decision a fulL award of her contribution 
to the condo purchase price. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of Judge 
Croft was correct and correctly applied the law applicable to 
the claims of intervener and plaintiff. Appellants submit that 
this court should order that his opinion be reinstated, that the 
judgment entered by him in the above-entitled action be affirmed, 
and that intervenor, as a party, be granted the judgment that he 
determined to be due it, 
DATED this day of , 1990. 
KING & ISAACSON, P.C. 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Appellants 
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